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This article examines the principle of State sover-
eignty in international law and how this affects the 
management of shared natural resources, in par-
ticular international watercourses. As one of the 
most fundamental principles of international law, 
State sovereignty is often considered an impedi-
ment to common management of international wa-
tercourses as it creates focus on national segments 
of the resource and on defining each State’s rights 
and entitlements to utilization. Through the study 
of alternative paradigms of State sovereignty, this 
article will endeavour to give new perspectives on 
how the principle can contribute to progressive 
development in the management of international 
shared resources.
Introduction
The principle of territorial sovereignty is a fun-
damental and constitutive principle of interna-
tional law as it accords the sovereign State exclu-
sive rights to exercise powers within the limits 
of its own territory as well as the right to prevent 
other States from doing the same. Possession of 
sovereign powers has traditionally been the one 
defining feature of the conventional subjects on 
the international legal stage, and the dynamic of 
exercising these powers is “an essential founda-
tion of international relations”.1
In the field of international watercourses, the 
upstream-downstream nexus creates an under-
lying conflict between the rights, needs and uses 
of the different watercourse States. In order to 
utilize the watercourse sustainably and optimal-
ly, and to secure the needs and rights of each, 
the involved States are compelled to enter into 
cooperation.
The central guiding principles when making 
decisions concerning the utilization of interna-
tional watercourses are the principle of equita-
ble and reasonable utilization and the obligation 
not to cause significant transboundary harm.2 
However, in recent times we are experiencing an 
increased focus on the interconnectedness of nat-
ural resources and how exaggerated use of one 
aspect or in one particular area of the resource 
can cause harm, not only to other States but also 
to the resource itself. In addition, growing threat 
from climate change in form of draught, flood, 
and pollution do not respect political borders. 
There is an increasing demand for more holistic 
management of international natural resources, 
with focus on the ecosystem approach or com-
munity of interest doctrine, which both invite 
1 The Corfu Channel Case, ICJ (1949), 35.
2 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, 
United Nations, 1997, Art. 5 and 7.
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to more committing cooperation between the 
involved States. The idea of managing a trans-
boundary resource as one unit without much 
regard to the boundaries drawn across it is an 
obvious challenge for the traditional conception 
of sovereignty. It creates and interesting dynamic 
between two areas of State concern: the interest 
of sustainable and optimal management of its 
natural resources, and the interest of protecting 
its sovereignty. 
In this article, I argue that instead of focusing on 
the right of each State to utilize the water on its 
own territory in an equitable manner, the whole 
watercourse and the needs of all watercourse 
States must be taken into consideration and the 
watercourse managed as one unit. This form of 
management, through the community of inter-
est doctrine or the ecosystem approach, presents 
new challenges for the conventional understand-
ing of sovereignty.
The article is composed by three main parts: 
the first part consists of a short historic review 
of the principle of State sovereignty and an ex-
amination of its fundamental content, as well as 
a short introduction to the community of interest 
doctrine. In the second part I raise the claim that 
the traditional perception of State sovereignty 
is no longer in accord with today’s reality, and 
present three fundamental reasons for this. Fur-
ther, the third part confronts the role of State 
sovereignty in the management of international 
watercourses, and raises the question whether 
the traditional paradigm of sovereignty can be 
interpreted in a manner that encourages new and 
more engaged forms of management of these 
watercourses. 
Part one: Short contextual review
The concept of the sovereign State was estab-
lished through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
which marked the beginning of a shift of legal 
paradigms from person-oriented to territory- ori-
ented law.3 Although this series of peace trea-
ties did not establish peace throughout Europe, 
they did establish the basis for national self-de-
termination and the beginnings of international 
law. The concept of the nation State was estab-
lished, and its raison d’être was sovereignty over 
its own territory and in relation to other States. 
The principle of State sovereignty has been 
interpreted and employed by the international 
courts in numerous cases concerning both ter-
ritorial and executive sovereignty. In the 1927 
Lotus case, where the question was whether Tur-
key had jurisdiction to sentence a French marine 
Lieutenant for a ship accident that took place on 
the high seas, the PCIJ declared that “[r]estric-
tions upon the independence of States cannot 
[…] be presumed”,4 but that one important 
restriction was that power “cannot be exercised 
by a State outside its territory except by virtue 
of a permissive rule derived from internation-
al custom or from a convention”.5 The Court 
stated that “within these limits, [a State’s] title to 
exercise its jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty”, 
and concluded thereby that a State is free to ex-
ercise power on its own territory, as long as no 
rule of international law prohibits such activity. 
Since the Lotus case, the number of international 
norms and customary rules limiting State sov-
ereignty has increased significantly, as a natural 
legal consequence of the obligation to respect the 
sovereignty of other States,6 but the main rule 
3 Franz Xaver Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty: From In-
dependence to Interdependence in the Structure of Interna-
tional Environmental Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law In-
ternational, 2000), 22; Rossana Deplano, “The Welfarist 
Approach to International Law,” in Critical International 
Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism and Transnationalism, ed. 
P. Singh and B. Mayer (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2014).
4 The Case of the S.S “Lotus”, PCIJ (1927), 18.
5 The Case of the S.S “Lotus”, (1927), 18.
6 Antonio Cassese, International law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 98.
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from the Lotus case still carries deep resonance 
in traditional international law.
The field of international watercourses sheds a 
different light on the issue of sovereignty. When 
a shared water resource crosses the boundary be-
tween two or more States, each State’s use of the 
water is depending on other States’ use or misuse 
of the same resource. This interdependency cre-
ates new restrictions upon the sovereign powers 
of the State. Through international customary 
law, and now also through the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC), 
the current international rules of transboundary 
 water management are those of equitable and 
reasonable utilization,7 and avoidance of signifi-
cant transboundary harm.8 These norms com-
pel watercourse States to enter into cooperation 
over the management of a shared watercourse,9 
and to take each other’s needs and rights into 
consideration when planning and carrying out 
projects in the watercourse. The principles thus 
limit the free exercise of State sovereignty as they 
construct minimum legal frames for a peaceful 
co-existence of watercourse States.
International courts have repeatedly stated 
that territorial sovereignty should not be a guid-
ing principle for the management of shared 
natural resources. In the River Oder judgment, 
the PCIJ established the idea of the “community 
of interest” in an international watercourse, the 
main features of which are “the perfect equal-
ity of all riparian States in the user of the whole 
7 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, 
United Nations, 1997, Art. 5.
8 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, 
United Nations, 1997, Art. 7.
9 See also “The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Non-navigational Uses of International Water-
courses”, United Nations, 1997, Art. 8.
course of the river and the exclusion of any pref-
erential privilege of any one riparian State in re-
lation to the others”.10 This judgment gave rise 
to the community of interest doctrine, which, in 
essence, views the watercourse as one economic 
unit to be managed by the watercourse states in 
common. The doctrine is a concretization of a 
conception of common management and is given 
concrete expression in an increasing number of 
international agreements.11 
The ideas from the River Oder case were re-
peated by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
judgment, where one of the main questions was 
whether Slovenia had violated international legal 
norms when unilaterally carrying out a project on 
the Danube river that was initially planned as a 
cooperation between Slovakia and Hungary. The 
Court first confirmed that the principles from the 
River Oder case had been strengthened for non-
navigational uses of international watercourses, 
and further that “Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally 
assuming control of a shared resource, and there-
by depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable 
and reasonable share of the natural resources of 
the Danube […] failed to respect the proportion-
ality which is required by international law”.12 
Consequently, the ICJ strengthens equity as a 
guiding principle for international shared re-
sources, and confirms that State sovereignty in 
this field is subject to more restrictions than in 
other fields of international law.
10 Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Commission of the River Oder, PCIJ (1929), 27.
11 Stephen McCaffrey, The law of international watercours-
es, The Oxford international law library (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 155.
12 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ 
(1997), para. 85.
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Part two: Traditional State Sovereignty 
today 
The international legal arena is undergoing 
changes. Globalization and consequences of 
climate change draw up new lines for State re-
sponsibility and compel States to create different 
forms of cooperation. New technology has per-
mitted the construction of immense dams and 
similar projects of water manipulation, which, 
together with transboundary impact of pollu-
tion, deforestation and draught, often leaves 
unilateral action vain and require States to coop-
erate closely in the management of international 
natural resources. On this background, there is 
reason to claim that the key elements of the tra-
ditional interpretation of State sovereignty, that 
is the exclusive right to exercise power its own 
territory and the right to exclude other from do-
ing the same, no longer reflect today’s reality in 
international water law. The claim is based on 
three main reasons:
Firstly, a traditional interpretation of the prin-
ciple of State sovereignty might present a real 
obstruction to the common management of in-
ternational watercourses. According to the in-
terpretation deriving from the Lotus case, the 
principle of State sovereignty would accord a 
State the right to exploit its resources freely and 
without interference from other States, as long 
as no rule of international law restricts such uti-
lization. A principle of State sovereignty with 
emphasis on exclusive territorial powers and 
restrictions only upon explicit consent would ac-
cord watercourse States an unlimited freedom 
to utilize the resources on their territory without 
regards to possible harm such use could bring 
to other States. According to Eyal Benvenisti, it 
is precisely the principle of sovereignty together 
with the allocation of jurisdiction by political 
borders that “have joined forces to preclude an 
efficient and sustainable use of transboundary 
resources”.13 
In the field of international water law, the 
exercise of State sovereignty has been a recurrent 
topic of discussion; although no authoritative 
body has cited sovereignty as a guiding princi-
ple for international water management and the 
ICJ has even declared that shared resources must 
be allocated on the basis of equity.14 Although 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion and the obligation not to cause significant 
transboundary harm restricts the free utilization, 
there is no doubt that State sovereignty in many 
cases has given rise to arguments over rights and 
obligations on the expense of more fruitful and 
sustainable management. An example of this is 
the cooperation, or lack thereof, in the Tigris-
Euphrates watercourse where all attempts to 
cooperate so far have stranded in disagreement 
over basic definitions and the interpretation and 
application of international legal principles.15
A traditional interpretation of the principle 
of State sovereignty does not correspond well to 
13 Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing transboundary resources : in-
ternational law and optimal resource use (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002), 22.
14 Stephen McCaffrey, “The Siren Song of Sovereingty in 
International Water Relations,” in A History of Water, Se-
ries 3, volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law, ed. 
Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre, and Tadesse Kassa Woldet-
sadik (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 47. See Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion case, ICJ (1974); Case concerning the Continental Shelf, 
(1985); Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 
(1997); Case Conserning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 
(2010).
15 See Annika Kramer, Aysegul Kibaroglu, and Waltina 
Scheumann, Turkey’s Water Policy National Frameworks 
and International Cooperation (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2011); Aysegul Kibaroglu, Building a 
regime for the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin (Lon-
don: Kluwer Law, 2002); Julie Gjørtz Howden, “Utiliza-
tion of International Watercourses: Aspects of applicable 
international law and practice in the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse” (Bergen, 2012), Master thesis, Bergen Open 
Research Archive – https://bora.uib.no/.
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the transboundary nature of international wa-
tercourses or other shared resources. It does not 
take into account the States’ shared responsibility 
for protection and preservation of the resource. 
And instead of establishing such responsibility 
beyond the borders of the single State, the tra-
ditional paradigm of State sovereignty strength-
ens the political frontiers that divide natural 
 resources.
Secondly, due to the complex nature of interna-
tional water conflicts, the paradigm of the sover-
eign State as negotiator and decision-maker on 
the international level on behalf of its population, 
may not offer the most efficient or most demo-
cratic system for international resource manage-
ment. Within a shared resource, utilization of 
water will necessarily be subject to negotiation 
where all relevant factors must be taken into re-
gard. The participants in such negotiations are 
States, while water consumers are individuals 
and businesses. Sovereign States act as repre-
sentatives for their respective domestic groups 
and organisations, which make their primary 
motivation for negotiating an agreement over 
the utilization of an international watercourse to 
secure the interests of their own groups. Hence 
conflict and competition over quantity and qual-
ity of water use will often occur between domes-
tic groups or between transnational groups, and 
influence the external policies adopted by the 
States. 
The democratic problem with this system 
is that relatively small high-interest groups, like 
agricultural or industrial lobbies, can acquire dis-
proportionate influence over the decision-mak-
ers, on the expense of larger and less fortunate 
groups. These strong domestic interest groups 
can in many cases pressure both the negotiators 
of the actual treaty as well as “the legislature’s 
attitude towards the treaty during the ratification 
process”,16 and thereby influence their country’s 
attitude towards compliance with the treaty and 
reaction to breaches by other parties.
Moreover, the nature of political decision-
making adds an essential aspect to this analysis. 
The State representatives negotiating internation-
al agreements, as well as the representatives who 
ratify them, are usually politicians, or engaged 
by politicians, and thereby vulnerable to popu-
larity and public opinion. Although politicians 
explicitly have taken on the demanding task of 
managing natural resources in a long-term per-
spective, they are doubtlessly also influenced by 
the short-term aspects of elections, as well as by 
the financial support many political parties re-
ceive from small domestic interest groups. Bal-
ancing such contradictory interests can lead to 
less efficient management of the resource,17 and 
could also result in agreements that might not 
take fully into account the needs and rights of 
smaller interest groups with strong proximity to 
the resource but meagre influential power, i.e. 
local communities.
The third reason why the traditional conception 
of State sovereignty is not reflecting the pres-
ent reality is that the fundamental structures of 
international law are changing. As seen above, 
international law has traditionally been under-
stood as a system where the State was restricted 
by international legal norms only upon explicit 
consent. Bruno Simma labels this system ‘bilater-
alism’, in which “international legal obligations 
[…] exist at the level of relations between States 
individually”.18 Similarly, Ellen Hey describes 
16 Benvenisti, Sharing transboundary resources : interna-
tional law and optimal resource use, 65.
17 Sharing transboundary resources : international law and 
optimal resource use, 59.
18 Bruno Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest in International Law,” in Recueil des Cours 250, 
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the traditional system as an inter-state pattern 
of international law.19 This view on internation-
al legal relations is individualistic, since every 
obligation or process requires the consent of 
the involved States. It also corroborates the tra-
ditional subject/object doctrine of international 
law, where States are considered subjects and 
individuals are objects or addressees of norms 
and regulations. Although this positivist view 
of sovereignty and international law has been 
gradually abandoned during the last decades,20 
it is still a major issue at most international ne-
gotiations. 
In contrast to this traditional legal pattern, stands 
the evolving ecosystem approach. This approach 
is “a strategy for the integrated management of 
land, water and living resources that promotes 
conservation and sustainable use in an equitable 
way”.21 Instead of focusing on the territorial sec-
tions of a watercourse, the ecosystem approach 
obliges States to manage the ecosystem as one 
unit. The approach thus creates new premises for 
cooperation, and presents an obvious challenge 
for the traditional conception of sovereignty. This 
alteration in the basic structures of international 
law comes with the experience of climate change 
Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Acad-
emy of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1994), 230.
19 Ellen Hey, Teaching international law: state-consent as 
consent to a process of normative development and ensuing 
problems (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003).
20 Rosalyn Higgins, “Conceptual Thinking About the 
Individual in International Law,” in International Law: a 
Contemporary Perspective, ed. Richard Falk, Friedrich Kra-
tochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1985); P. K. Menon, “The Legal Personal-
ity of Individuals,” Sri Lanka Journal of Intenational Law 6, 
no. 127 (1994); Prosper Weil, “Le Droit International en 
quête de son indentité: cours général de droit internation-
al public,” in Recueil des Cours 237 (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhof Publishers, 1992).
21 “Decision V6 ‘Ecosystem Approach’”, The Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000, UNEP/COP/5/23.
and the recognition of the holistic character of 
natural resources; political borders are artificial 
borders drawn across natural resources, and 
thereby not an optimal way to delimit coopera-
tion and management. The ecosystem approach 
necessitates cooperation on the lowest appropri-
ate level to ensure efficiency and equitability, 
and management that “involve[s] stakeholders 
and balance[s] local interests with the wider pub-
lic interests” 22 because “[t]he closer management 
is to the ecosystem, the greater the responsibility, 
ownership, accountability, participation and use 
of knowledge”.23 To pursue their common inter-
est of environmental protection and sustainable 
utilization of natural resources, States are en-
couraged to create cooperation schemes on both 
international and transnational levels where the 
main objective is common management instead 
of the definition of individual entitlements in the 
resource.
The ecosystem approach is but one example 
of an ideological change in international law, 
turning towards community structures and com-
munity values. It acknowledges that States have 
rights and obligations that are not exhausted by 
inter-state agreements, but also derive from the 
common, maybe even unidentified, values and 
interests that they have a natural engagement to 
realize on behalf of the international community 
as a whole.24 This is particularly visible in en-
22 “Decision V6 ‘Ecosystem Approach’”, The Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000, Principle 2.
23 “Decision V6 ‘Ecosystem Approach’”, The Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000, Principle 2.
24 See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s empire (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986); Simma, From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest in International Law; Bruno Simma 
and Andreas L. Paulus, “’The International Community: 
Facing the Challenge of Globalization’,” European Journal 
of International Law 9 (1998); Hey, Teaching international 
law: state-consent as consent to a process of normative develop-
ment and ensuing problems; Gleider I. Hernandez, “A Re-
luctant Guardian: The International Court of Justice and 
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vironmental questions, where responsibility for 
sustainable management and avoidance of trans-
boundary and inter-generational harm is forc-
ing the creation of new types of management. 
The traditional paradigm of State sovereignty 
restricts the development of this ideological turn 
in international law and is therefore no longer 
the accurate legal answer to the questions of the 
relationship between States.
Additionally, the traditional interpretation of the 
principle of State sovereignty does not reflect the 
constitutive development in international law. In 
recent times, the international legal personality 
of Non-Governmental Organizations and indi-
viduals enjoy increasing recognition.25 NGOs 
are progressively taking part in international 
negotiations as observers or consultants, and 
play an important role in the making and inter-
pretation of international law.26 With regard 
to the status of individuals, it is becoming less 
controversial to consider them as independent 
the Concept of ‘International Community’,” British Year-
book of International Law 83, no. 1 (2013); Andrew Hurrell, 
On global order: power, values, and the constitution of inter-
national society (Oxford: Oxford Universisty Press, 2007).
25 See e.g. Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the In-
dividual in International Law; Menon, “The Legal Per-
sonality of Individuals.”; Andrea Bianchi, “The Fight for 
Inclusion: Non-State Actors and International Law,” in 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour 
of Judge Bruno Simma, ed. Ulrich Fastenrath, et al. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Robert McCorquodale, 
International law beyond the state : essays on sovereignty, non-
state actors and human rights (London: CMP Pub., 2011); 
Bosire Maragia, “Almost there: Another way of concep-
tualizing and explaining NGOs’ quest for legitimacy in 
international law,” Non-State Actors and International Law 
2, no. 1 (2002); Anne Peters, “Membership in the Global 
Constitutional Society,” in The constitutionalization of in-
ternational law, ed. Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir 
Ulfstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Steve 
Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and In-
ternational Law,” American Journal of International Law 
100, no. 2 (2006).
26 “Nongovernmental Organizations and International 
Law.”
participants in the international legal system.27 
The overarching idea is, as expressed by Brierly, 
that an expansion of the subjects of internation-
al law to include individuals may enhance the 
prospects for peace, because it will expand the 
range of interests to be considered in the settle-
ment of disputes and counteract the pernicious 
tendency of governments to identify the interests 
of a few powerful individuals with the interests 
of the whole community.28 This brings us back 
to the problem of democracy in the management 
of shared natural resources and the governing 
States’ inclination towards favouring strong 
domestic interest groups. The act of according 
non-State actors more legal personality in inter-
national negotiations is thus not only in accor-
dance with the modern development of interna-
tional law, but also a means to secure a more just 
and sustainable use of shared natural resources. 
When the traditional paradigm of State sover-
eignty excludes other actors than States, it is a 
strong indication that the paradigm no longer 
reflects today’s reality.
Part three: Alternative approaches to  
State sovereignty
In an environmental context, the traditional 
paradigm of State sovereignty has been deemed 
a possible impediment to optimal and efficient 
management,29 since States might be reluctant to 
27 See e.g. Bianchi, The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State 
Actors and International Law; Jean-Marie Dupuy, Droit 
International Public (Paris: Dalloz, 1993); McCorquodale, 
International law beyond the state : essays on sovereignty, non-
state actors and human rights.
28 Quoted in Nehal Bhuta, “The Role International  Actors 
Other Than States can Play in the New World Order,” in 
Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, ed. An-
tonio Cassese (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
29 See Karen T. Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopoli-
tics,” Merhson International Studies Review 41, no. 2 (1997); 
Undala Alam, Ousmane Dione, and Paul Jeffrey, “The 
benefit-sharing principle: Implementing sovereignty bar-
gains on water,” Political Geography 28, no. 2 (2009).
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enter into committing cooperation that restricts 
their inherent sovereignty. Here one must bear in 
mind however, that State sovereignty in relation 
to the utilization of international watercourses is 
de jure restricted by the principle of equitable uti-
lization and by the no-harm obligation.30 States 
also have a legal obligation to cooperate over the 
utilization of international watercourses, codi-
fied in UNWC Art. 8.
There is no doubt, as numerous treaties 
show, that the principle of State sovereignty is 
not de facto impeding States from entering into 
cooperation over shared natural resources, al-
though a great number of these agreements are 
technical or regulate the mere co-existence of 
watercourse States and their utilization of the 
waters.31 However, there seem to be a discrep-
ancy between theory and practice in issues of 
environmental law. As numerous climate meet-
ings and negotiations show, the big words and 
ambitions expressed by State representatives in 
advance often result in little or no concrete action 
because of the States’ reluctance towards con-
cluding binding agreements and compromise 
aspects of their sovereignty. In this regard there 
is no doubt that State sovereignty is an impedi-
ment to achieving optimal management, which 
gives reason to address the question whether the 
concept of State sovereignty must be interpreted 
differently – through other paradigms – to en-
courage more committed and invested coopera-
30 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, 
United Nations, 1997, Art. 5 and 7.
31 E.g. “Convention on cooperation for the protection 
and sustainable use of the River Danube”, 1994; “Agree-
ment between the government of the People’s republic 
of Bangladesh and the government of the Republic of 
India on sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka and 
on augmenting its flows”, 1977; “Indus Waters Treaty”, 
India, Pakistan, 1960; “Agreement on the protection of 
the Rivers Meuse and Scheldt”, Belgium, France, Neth-
erlands, 1994.
tion over international natural resources, with 
focus on sustainability and optimal utilization 
of the resource. The following subsections will 
thus conduct an analysis of some of the alterna-
tive approaches to sovereignty offered by legal 
scholars and political scientists. The first two, 
sovereignty bargains and extended sovereignty, 
are more theoretical adaptations of the principle 
of State sovereignty that allows more flexibility 
when managing natural resources. The other two 
approaches, the concept of benefit sharing and 
the transnational conflict paradigm, demand a 
higher degree of participation and commitment 
from the involved States. 
Sovereignty bargains
The term ‘sovereignty bargains’, introduced by 
Bruce Byers, describes a concept where “a state 
gives up some measure of control over its con-
stituent bioregions and ‘nations’”.32 The concept 
was later developed by Karen Litfin as a trade-off 
between the three constituent elements of sov-
ereignty – autonomy, control and legitimacy.33 
For instance, sacrificing autonomy can enhance 
control, or “increased control may undercut a 
state’s popular or international legitimacy”.34 
Litfin further advocates that 
“[t]he claim that various interdependencies, 
including ecological ones, are modifying 
the practice – and perhaps even the mean-
ing – of sovereignty does not warrant the 
conclusion that sovereign states are about 
to be replaced by some new form of politi-
cal organization. Rather, states engage in 
sovereignty bargains in which they volun-
tarily accept some limitations in exchange 
32 Bruce Byers, “Ecoregions, State Sovereignty and Con-
flict,” Securiy Dialogue 22, no. 1 (1991), 73.
33 Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics.”
34 “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” 169–170.
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for certain benefits. The cumulative effect 
on these trade-offs, however, may be to alter 
the norms and practices of sovereignty by 
reconfiguring expectations regarding state 
autonomy, control and legitimacy”.35
The main idea is that States will accept a limita-
tion on their sovereignty if the benefit they re-
ceive from doing so is sufficiently significant. The 
positive benefit from cooperation will outweigh 
qualms about renouncing sovereign capability. 
The idea of sovereignty bargains presup-
poses a multidimensional understanding of the 
concept of sovereignty, where sovereignty is be-
ing conceived more as a collection of norms and 
practices that can display variation and flexibili-
ty.36 Or, according to Litfin, not as a fixed prin-
ciple but rather “a field of meanings that are in 
constant flux”.37 Brad Roth advocates that sover-
eignty can be regarded as a set of presumptions 
for a pluralist order.38 Both views are reminders 
of the fact that de jure and de facto sovereignty 
may sometimes act as two different concepts; 
while de jure sovereignty is a legal principle of 
indivisible and absolute authority, de facto sov-
ereignty is the result of the States’ interpretation 
of this principle, their actions in accordance with 
it.39 The concept of sovereignty bargains thus 
focus on the latter – the actual exercise of sover-
eignty, and tasks and responsibilities associated 
with it. As Litfin points out, these tasks can be, 
and regularly are, separated.40
35 “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” 170.
36 Christopher Rudolph, “Sovereignty and Territorial 
Borders in a Global Age,” International Studies Review 7 
(2005), 4.
37 Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” 171.
38 Brad R. Roth, “The Enduring Significance of State 
Sovereignty,” Florida Law Review 56 (2004).
39 Litfin uses the terms ‘legal’ and ‘operational’ sover-
eignty (Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics.”)
40 “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” 171.
Sovereignty bargains can be formally encapsulat-
ed as international agreements or institutions.41 
In practice, the agreement is the most common 
manifestation of cooperation over international 
resources. This indicates that States may not be 
as intentional and conscious towards the concept 
of ‘sovereignty bargains’ as the term suggests.42 
When creating an institution for the management 
of a shared resource, member States will accept a 
trade-off of autonomy and control, and in some 
cases also legitimacy, in order to ameliorate the 
utilization of the waters and achieve common 
goals. A cumulative effect of such bargains may 
eventually be an alteration in the conception of 
sovereignty, and its norms and practices, by “re-
configuring expectations regarding state auton-
omy, control and legitimacy”.43
Extended sovereignty – State consent as 
 consent to a process
Ellen Hey describes two normative patterns of 
international law – the inter-state normative pat-
tern, which is briefly described above, and the 
common interest normative pattern.44 The lat-
ter suggests a different approach to the question 
of State sovereignty and State consent: Instead 
of considering State consent a prerequisite for 
the creation and binding nature of an interna-
tional legal norm, the common interest pattern 
perceives State consent as consent to a process 
of normative development.45 The thriving inter-
actions and exchanges of the globalized world 
demands a different form of legal regulation for 
issues of common interest, and “as such issues 
41 Alam, Dione, and Jeffrey, “The benefit-sharing prin-
ciple: Implementing sovereignty bargains on water.”
42 Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics.”
43 “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics,” 170.
44 Hey, Teaching international law: state-consent as consent 
to a process of normative development and ensuing problems.
45 Teaching international law: state-consent as consent to 
a process of normative development and ensuing problems, 
12–23.
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are being addressed, it is becoming apparent that 
existing decision-making processes are intimate-
ly linked to the inter-state normative pattern and 
not attuned to the common-interest normative 
pattern where actors other than states may be di-
rectly affected by decisions taken”.46 A proposed 
response to the challenge of transboundary re-
source management is to view State consent not 
as consent to a specific rule of international law, 
but as consent to a process of normative develop-
ment, “the outcome of which is undetermined at 
the time at which that consent is given”.47 States 
give their consent to an instrument of interna-
tional law aimed at regulating the common inter-
est, and in so doing they also commit to partici-
pate in the normative development and to accept 
its final outcome. 
An example of such consent to a process of 
normative development is the European Court 
of Human Rights. The Court belongs to the com-
mon interest normative pattern as it engages in 
questions that concern humanity as a whole. 
When States ratify the European Convention on 
Human Rights, they do not only give their con-
sent to specific rules of international law, but also 
to a process of legal development through the 
judgments of the ECHR. The Court’s decisions 
are binding for its parties and contribute to the 
development of international law. 
Most instruments seeking the regulation of com-
mon interests contain provisions that allow inte-
gration of evolving principles. An example can 
be found in the initial agreement between Hun-
gary and Czecholsovakia over the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros-project which requires that the 
parties “while carrying out their obligations to 
ensure that the quality of water in the Danube is 
46 Teaching international law: state-consent as consent to a 
process of normative development and ensuing problems, 19.
47 Teaching international law: state-consent as consent to a 
process of normative development and ensuing problems, 13.
not impaired and that nature is protected, to take 
new environmental norms into considerations 
when agreeing upon the means to be specified 
in the Joint Contractual Plan”.48 By agreeing 
to take into consideration new environmental 
norms, Hungary and Czechoslovakia consent-
ed in practice to a process, the final outcome of 
which was not known to the parties at the time 
of the agreement. The softening of the principle 
of State sovereignty implied in this provision 
provides flexibility in the cooperation between 
the parties and the possibility of achieving a 
dynamic process where the original agreement 
can incorporate and deal with new development 
without revision of the agreement or the parties’ 
explicit consent. 
The elasticity of the common-interest pattern is 
what makes it suitable as guiding pattern for the 
management of international watercourses. This 
is especially important when watercourse States 
create a joint commission to manage the water-
course and carry out decisions on their behalf, the 
flexibility in the long-term consent will lead to a 
more efficient management of the resource since 
States agree on the overarching goals instead of 
the small steps. Additionally, providing a neu-
tral commission with the competence to manage 
a watercourse in accordance with agreed prin-
ciples and towards a common goal might also 
help neutralize domestic political pressure. On 
the other hand, it is clear that this form of gov-
ernment demands a great level of trust amongst 
the watercourse States and clear agreement on a 
common vision for the cooperation. This might 
be particularly challenging in water scarce areas 
where the threat of draught can lead to competi-
tion between watercourse States eager to satisfy 
their minimum needs.
48 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ 
(1997), para. 112.
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Benefit sharing
One of the main objectives behind the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity is “the conservation 
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources”.49 The concept of benefit shar-
ing, as manifested in the convention, has gained 
increased recognition during the last decades, es-
pecially in the context of natural resource man-
agement. Alam et al. define the concept within a 
freshwater context as “the development of water 
uses in their ‘optimal’ locations, and the distribu-
tion of these benefits, rather than the water, to 
users across the basin”.50 Phillips et al. argue that 
benefit sharing “becomes the outcome of a pro-
cess of issue-linkage”,51 where basic dilemmas 
like the complexity of common pool resources 
and the prospect of over-exploitation due to lack 
of regulation or non-compliance are considered. 
And it is when solving such fundamental dilem-
mas that the major benefits are to be found. The 
basic idea is that watercourse States, when nego-
tiating the management of shared watercourses, 
can focus either on the allocation of rights or on 
the distribution of benefits.52 Arrangements of 
benefit sharing will involve payment or com-
pensation for benefits deriving from strength-
ened management.53 For instance, Sadoff and 
Grey argue that “stewardship of headwaters and 
watersheds might entitle upstream riparians to 
49 “Convention on Biological Diversity”, 1992, Art. 1.
50 Alam, Dione, and Jeffrey, “The benefit-sharing prin-
ciple: Implementing sovereignty bargains on water,” 93.
51 David Phillips et al., “Trans-boundary Water Co-
operation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader 
Benefit Sharing”, (2006), 173.
52 C. W. Sadoff and D. Grey, “Cooperation on interna-
tional rivers: A continuum for securing and sharing ben-
efits,” Water International 30, no. 4 (2005), 422.
53 Owen McIntyre, “Benefit-sharing and upstream/
downstream cooperation for ecological protection of 
transboundary waters: opportunities for China as an up-
stream state,” Water International 40, no. 1 (2015), 50.
share some portion of the downstream benefits 
that their stewardship helps to facilitate, and 
thus share the costs of that stewardship. Seen 
the other way around, if they did not protect the 
watershed it would impose costs on downstream 
riparians”.54 A scheme of benefit sharing could 
thus mean that some States must renounce some 
of their actual water use, or available water, in ex-
change for a monetary compensation from those 
States who put this water into its most efficient 
use.55 At the other end of this process are three 
broad categories of benefits: security, economic 
development and environmental protection.56
Alam et al. recognize that the implementa-
tion of the benefit sharing principle centres on 
two aspects: “the countries’ willingness to em-
brace their hydro-interdependency and […] the 
means they use to embed their mutual interest, 
or in other words, to frame their liability and vul-
nerability to one another”.57 The first aspect is 
clearly among the main motivations to establish 
cooperation over a shared watercourse; instead 
of competing over individual entitlements that 
are both limiting and potentially harmful, States 
must realize that their interests are best achieved 
by sharing the benefits from the water manage-
ment. The other central aspect, the means the 
States choose to pursue their shared interests 
and benefits, is essential for the functioning of 
the cooperation, its duration and trust-building 
among the watercourse States. To ensure the 
equal sharing of benefits and for the cooperation 
54 Sadoff and Grey, “Cooperation on international riv-
ers: A continuum for securing and sharing benefits,” 423.
55 A. Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters, “Are Shared 
Benefits of International Waters an Equitable Apportion-
ment?,” Colorado Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 
18, no. 2 (2007), 527.
56 Phillips et al., “Trans-boundary Water Co-operation 
as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit 
Sharing”, 174
57 Alam, Dione, and Jeffrey, “The benefit-sharing prin-
ciple: Implementing sovereignty bargains on water,” 94.
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to be advantageous for all States, the collective 
investments and benefit sharing must take place 
within clearly defined legal frames.
The transnational conflict paradigm
Benvenisti’s transnational conflict paradigm of-
fers yet another alternative to the Westphalian 
tradition, as it suggests that States are composed 
of many competing domestic groups that should 
be given more autonomy in the process of shared 
resource management. The paradigm looks 
through the veil of sovereignty and explains the 
sources and cures of international conflict and 
agreements.58 The reason for this, Benvenisti 
explains, is that these domestic groups are of-
ten competing over the same resources and op-
portunities and that this competition is reflected 
in the States’ external policies. As seen above, 
conflicts over the utilization of an international 
watercourse does not necessarily originate from 
disagreements between States, but in many cases 
rather “from transnational competition among 
rival domestic groups or even from collusion 
between several interest groups, all in an effort 
to capture a disproportionately larger share and 
externalize costs at the expense of other inter-
est groups within those states, including future 
generations”.59 This makes international nego-
tiations a two-level game where States consult 
both with each other and with their respective 
domestic actors, without having any guaranteed 
control over the process or the outcome. An ex-
ample of the influence of such domestic pressure 
groups can be found in the Gabčikovo Nagyma-
ros case. The second main questions in this case 
was whether Hungary could legally withdraw 
from the agreement because of pressure from 
domestic environmental groups. The possible 
58 Benvenisti, Sharing transboundary resources : interna-
tional law and optimal resource use, 49.
59 Sharing transboundary resources : international law and 
optimal resource use, 49.
environmental impact of the planned project had 
gained much negative attention in Hungary, and 
as a result of the “intense criticism which the 
Project had generated”60 from various groups, 
the Hungarian government first decided to sus-
pend the works at Nagymaros and later to aban-
don the project all together. The Court stressed 
the importance of international obligations at the 
expense of domestic pressure groups, and found 
that Hungary’s unilateral withdrawal from the 
project was a breach of its treaty obligations.61 
Consequently, the pressure on the government 
from Hungarian interest groups eventually re-
sulted in a violation of the country’s internation-
al legal obligations.
The transnational conflict paradigm is construct-
ed on a modern understanding of international 
law and its actors. It suggests that collective ac-
tion problems are best solved on a transnational 
level, where groups and institutions are given an 
individual voice and opportunity to participate 
in law making and negotiations instead of be-
ing represented by their respective governments. 
The challenge for classic sovereignty rests in the 
fact that the paradigm redistributes power that 
is normally reserved States. Domestic pressure 
groups may thus achieve an individual voice and 
60 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ 
(1997), 25. On the influence of environmental groups and 
the domestic debate in Hungary see Lilliana Botcheva, 
“Focus and Effectiveness of Environmental Activism 
in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study of Environ-
mental Movements in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania,” Journal of Environment and Development 5, 
no. 3 (1996); Nick Manning, “Patterns of Environmental 
Movements in Eastern Europe,” Environmental Politics 
7, no. 2 (1998); Tamàs Fleischer, “Jaws on the Danube: 
Water Management, Regime Change and the Movement 
Against the Middle Danube Hydroelectric Dam,” Inter-
national Journal of Urban and Regional Research 17, no. 3 
(1993).
61 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ 
(1997), 46. See also Benvenisti, Sharing transboundary re-
sources : international law and optimal resource use.
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a possibility to participate directly in the process 
of managing an international watercourse. This 
could prevent domestic political constraints to 
spill over to the international scene,62 at the 
same time as it might ensure a closer connection 
between the decision-makers and the users of the 
waters.  
Although the transnational conflict para-
digm reduces the total power of the State, it 
might contribute to an increase of the effective 
sovereign power in areas other than internation-
al resource management. Moreover, as is the case 
with many of the alternative perspectives on sov-
ereignty, the act of opening up for alternatives 
is itself an act of sovereignty. The power of the 
State is thus not lost but redistributed.
Conclusion
According to Benvenisti, we are left with two 
possibilities when choosing our fundamental 
approach to freshwater management: we can ei-
ther invest in defining individual entitlements 
in order to ensure the market value of water as 
an object of trade, or we can “forgo such dif-
ferentiation and develop alternatives to market 
transactions”.63 The community of interest ap-
proach, with its ruling vision of the unity of the 
watercourse and the demand for close coopera-
tion and commitment amongst the watercourse 
States, might offer such an alternative to market 
transactions. When establishing a community 
of interest, the process of defining and trading 
individual entitlements of utilization is counter-
productive to the very essence of the approach. 
The traditional, or archaic, understanding of 
sovereignty as freedom of action within territo-
rial borders is, in spite of the obligation to take 
into consideration the rights of other States, an 
62 Sharing transboundary resources : international law and 
optimal resource use, 47.
63 Sharing transboundary resources : international law and 
optimal resource use, 25.
impediment to the optimal utilization of the wa-
tercourse. Hence, when committing to managing 
an international watercourse through the com-
munity of interest approach, States are also com-
mitting to an alternative understanding of State 
sovereignty. 
Interpreting sovereignty within the community 
of interest approach must be in accordance with 
the inherent objectives of the approach, and fa-
cilitate the pursuit of common interests as well as 
the sustainable and optimal use of the resource. A 
first reflection is that long-term management of a 
natural resource demands much flexibility from 
the watercourse States and a certain dynamic in 
the agreements among them. Consenting to a 
process of development or management as de-
scribed by Hey thus appears to be a constructive 
approach. Whenever watercourse States decide 
to establish a community of interest in the man-
agement of a shared watercourse, they agree on 
certain principles and norms that create the basis 
for the cooperation. These norms and principles 
become the framework within which explicit 
State consent to every decision is not required. 
The involved States have already agreed explic-
itly to the process of management. This approach 
to sovereignty ensures efficiency in managing 
the watercourse while also strengthening the 
community notion amongst the involved States.
A second reflection is that the community 
of interest among watercourse States is a means 
to realize the interest that these States share. As 
opposed to defining individual entitlements, the 
community of interest approach focuses on the 
benefits of close cooperation and the common 
and individual gains. When turning the focus 
away from individual entitlements and towards 
common interest, the benefits from common 
management become more apparent. Interests 
and benefits are similar in this regard since they 
both are significant motivating factors for the cre-
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ation of the cooperation. Identification of shared 
interest is a first step towards the sharing of ben-
efits from a community of interest cooperation, 
but when establishing a community of interest 
in a shared watercourse, the actors are sharing 
not only benefits, but also risks, expenses and en-
vironmental responsibility associated with such 
management.
In consequence, the principle of State sovereign-
ty is not necessarily an impediment for common 
management of an international watercourse 
through the community of interest approach. 
However, this conclusion presupposes an alter-
native interpretation of sovereignty that is more 
adapted to the modern development of interna-
tional law and to the issues of collective action 
and common pool resources. By moving away 
from individual entitlements and allocation of 
water quanta, watercourse States can use their 
sovereign powers to create more dynamic forms 
of water management where they consent to the 
process and the main principles and focus on the 
sharing of benefits and costs.
